Between big powers, Thailand must stay on the middle path
John Draper,
Peerasit Kamnuansilpa
Special to The Nation July 3, 2015 1:00 am
The world does not need us-china antagonism and a new cold war paradigm
As Thailand's post-coup limbo continues, it is important for Thais to understand how more economically powerful countries view the country. In essence, Thailand presents a dilemma. Numerous coups, chronic bureaucratic irregularities and high social inequality have contributed to its poor ranking in the latest Global Peace Index of June 22. Such instability has a real economic cost - an estimated Bt1.7 trillion last year - due to terrorism, high incarceration rates, political demonstrations and violent crime.
Yet, as a country with a reasonably high Human Development Index in a strategic geographical location, Thailand is still being courted both by the United States, which this month reinstated the 2016 Cobra Gold military exercises, and by China, which just celebrated 40 years of international relations with Thailand.
These two countries view Thailand very differently. The US sees Thailand as a potential military ally and democratic development partner which will at least stay neutral in any US-Chinese conflict in the South China Sea. Still, according to US-influenced global values, Thailand is governed by an authoritarian regime, and as suggested by democracy indices such as the Freedom in the World Report, has limited media freedom.
In addition, CIA projects such as Polity IV see Thailand's recent political history as being divided with factionalism, splitting the political sphere into polar extremes via forces such as unmet needs for class- and ethnic-based policies for social equity. In such conditions, Western political theory sees two kinds of vote bidding taking place. The first is the jockeying for popular votes, and both Pheu Thai and the Democrats have adopted populist policy, directly distributing money to the poor. The second kind of vote bidding is the way the two major parties court small feudalist, geographically restricted parties.
The US sees the cure for this factionalism in promoting strong forms of civil society, underpinned by liberties such as freedom of speech. This then creates the conditions for a rebalancing of the political scene in which there is mutual respect for the democratic system, both in competition between parties on principles and competition within parties on policies. Hence, the US concerns over a detailed road map.
China, on the other hand, views Thailand as populated by a people originating in southwest China. It therefore lies naturally within China's expanding sphere of influence, as demonstrated by the launch this week of its Khon Kaen Consulate. Because of its size and location, Thailand is a welcome economic partner. As one of Asean's leading nations, it is also a potential political ally. Furthermore, Thailand's adoption of a national moral assembly and political oversight committees in the draft constitution fits with Asian communism's emphasis on collectivism over politics, or ""guided democracy"".
Thailand has been profoundly affected by Asian revolutions, the Second World War and the Vietnam War. The first revolution, in China, drove Thailand into the hands of the fascists and eventually into the bosom of Japanese imperialists, with whom the country eventually allied. Then, after the Allies won the Second World War and the American Century, or ""Pax Americana"", was established, Thailand looked towards the US to protect it from becoming a domino as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos fell to communist revolutions. At the time, authoritarian regimes were preferred as offering stability at the expense of freedoms - a mantra which resulted in hyper-nationalism and the October 6, 1976 massacre, which eventually led to the eradication of both communism and socialism.
Still, there exists in Thailand deep-rooted sentiment against overt capitalism due to the country's Buddhist heritage, and Thailand during the Cold War attempted to reconcile Buddhism with development. Developmental democracy was viewed both as a barrier to Asian communism and as a basic human right, necessary to progress out of absolute poverty and establish a welfare state.
Thailand and the US thus became development partners until 1997, when it became clear that the US could not shield Thailand from the Asian Crisis. This was arguably due to the US's massive financial commitments to its military industrial complex, typified by carrier-based warfare.
Because of this perceived abandonment, anti-US and nationalism-based isolationist sentiment began to emerge, compounded by disquiet at US ""imperialist"" influence, as it became the world's police force under the Bush presidencies, guided by the Project for the New American Century think-tank and also by concern at the commercialisation of culture.
Yet Thailand at this moment is allying itself with corporations promoting the exploitation of petroleum resources in the Northeast, when the country could be self-sufficient in hydro, solar and ocean thermal energy. The country is still locked into a development paradigm that favours an international corporatocracy.
Thailand, even without a close relationship with a major power, is not without allies and partners, particularly countries of the Global South such as its Asean neighbours, and also potentially the EU. In the latter, a range of democratic models exist, such as the consociational (power-sharing) governments of Belgium or Switzerland, which may provide patterns of political development, including social democracy, which are compatible with progressive Buddhism.
In addition, both the US and China must appreciate that Thailand cannot tolerate great-power political posturing. As was recently pointed out by George Soros in the New York Review of Books, the world does not need US-Chinese antagonisms and a new Cold War paradigm with the real risk of confrontation but a partnership designed to solve economic and global crises, such as climate change.
Fundamentally, neither US nor Chinese political theory can ever condone a constitutional monarchy, as it is not compatible with foundational concepts of republicanism or communism. Furthermore, Asian communism has little to offer except restrictions on freedoms and additional layers of bureaucracy, while the West proffers a vision of equality and meritocracy based on individual rights - the American Dream.
However, this dream is at present unworkable within Thailand due to massive disparities between groups. Instead, centrist, international models of social democracy offer results-oriented egalitarianism via the targeting of classes and ethnicities for greater opportunities. Building a more caring society is the middle road Thailand must take for long-term stability.
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Yet, as a country with a reasonably high Human Development Index in a strategic geographical location, Thailand is still being courted both by the United States, which this month reinstated the 2016 Cobra Gold military exercises, and by China, which just celebrated 40 years of international relations with Thailand.
These two countries view Thailand very differently. The US sees Thailand as a potential military ally and democratic development partner which will at least stay neutral in any US-Chinese conflict in the South China Sea. Still, according to US-influenced global values, Thailand is governed by an authoritarian regime, and as suggested by democracy indices such as the Freedom in the World Report, has limited media freedom.
In addition, CIA projects such as Polity IV see Thailand's recent political history as being divided with factionalism, splitting the political sphere into polar extremes via forces such as unmet needs for class- and ethnic-based policies for social equity. In such conditions, Western political theory sees two kinds of vote bidding taking place. The first is the jockeying for popular votes, and both Pheu Thai and the Democrats have adopted populist policy, directly distributing money to the poor. The second kind of vote bidding is the way the two major parties court small feudalist, geographically restricted parties.
The US sees the cure for this factionalism in promoting strong forms of civil society, underpinned by liberties such as freedom of speech. This then creates the conditions for a rebalancing of the political scene in which there is mutual respect for the democratic system, both in competition between parties on principles and competition within parties on policies. Hence, the US concerns over a detailed road map.
China, on the other hand, views Thailand as populated by a people originating in southwest China. It therefore lies naturally within China's expanding sphere of influence, as demonstrated by the launch this week of its Khon Kaen Consulate. Because of its size and location, Thailand is a welcome economic partner. As one of Asean's leading nations, it is also a potential political ally. Furthermore, Thailand's adoption of a national moral assembly and political oversight committees in the draft constitution fits with Asian communism's emphasis on collectivism over politics, or ""guided democracy"".
Thailand has been profoundly affected by Asian revolutions, the Second World War and the Vietnam War. The first revolution, in China, drove Thailand into the hands of the fascists and eventually into the bosom of Japanese imperialists, with whom the country eventually allied. Then, after the Allies won the Second World War and the American Century, or ""Pax Americana"", was established, Thailand looked towards the US to protect it from becoming a domino as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos fell to communist revolutions. At the time, authoritarian regimes were preferred as offering stability at the expense of freedoms - a mantra which resulted in hyper-nationalism and the October 6, 1976 massacre, which eventually led to the eradication of both communism and socialism.
Still, there exists in Thailand deep-rooted sentiment against overt capitalism due to the country's Buddhist heritage, and Thailand during the Cold War attempted to reconcile Buddhism with development. Developmental democracy was viewed both as a barrier to Asian communism and as a basic human right, necessary to progress out of absolute poverty and establish a welfare state.
Thailand and the US thus became development partners until 1997, when it became clear that the US could not shield Thailand from the Asian Crisis. This was arguably due to the US's massive financial commitments to its military industrial complex, typified by carrier-based warfare.
Because of this perceived abandonment, anti-US and nationalism-based isolationist sentiment began to emerge, compounded by disquiet at US ""imperialist"" influence, as it became the world's police force under the Bush presidencies, guided by the Project for the New American Century think-tank and also by concern at the commercialisation of culture.
Yet Thailand at this moment is allying itself with corporations promoting the exploitation of petroleum resources in the Northeast, when the country could be self-sufficient in hydro, solar and ocean thermal energy. The country is still locked into a development paradigm that favours an international corporatocracy.
Thailand, even without a close relationship with a major power, is not without allies and partners, particularly countries of the Global South such as its Asean neighbours, and also potentially the EU. In the latter, a range of democratic models exist, such as the consociational (power-sharing) governments of Belgium or Switzerland, which may provide patterns of political development, including social democracy, which are compatible with progressive Buddhism.
In addition, both the US and China must appreciate that Thailand cannot tolerate great-power political posturing. As was recently pointed out by George Soros in the New York Review of Books, the world does not need US-Chinese antagonisms and a new Cold War paradigm with the real risk of confrontation but a partnership designed to solve economic and global crises, such as climate change.
Fundamentally, neither US nor Chinese political theory can ever condone a constitutional monarchy, as it is not compatible with foundational concepts of republicanism or communism. Furthermore, Asian communism has little to offer except restrictions on freedoms and additional layers of bureaucracy, while the West proffers a vision of equality and meritocracy based on individual rights - the American Dream.
However, this dream is at present unworkable within Thailand due to massive disparities between groups. Instead, centrist, international models of social democracy offer results-oriented egalitarianism via the targeting of classes and ethnicities for greater opportunities. Building a more caring society is the middle road Thailand must take for long-term stability.